Denise Caruso
February 2002
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ABSTRACT
The scientific achievements of the past 30 years in molecular biology have produced an unprecedented volume of genetic material, information and experimental activity. The post-genome age began to gestate with the creation of recombinant DNA technology in 1972, which for the first time allowed genes from one organism to be inserted into another, and “officially” arrived in February 2001 with the completion of the historic sequencing of the human genome.

During that 30-year period, the products of genomic biology writ large have gradually become an integral part of the Zeitgeist–genes themselves and their various components, genetically modified and engineered organisms in drugs and food, databases filled with the genetic identities of millions of people, ever-cheaper and more powerful technology to deconstruct and analyze these tiny, potent strands of identity. Not only do these stand to permanently alter our notions of human autonomy, the natural environment and health but, perhaps most fundamentally, they force us to reconsider our definition and perception of public risk.

Protecting the public from undue risk is the job of governance. The degree to which the scientific risks posed by the products of genomic biology are still largely unknown–and the social and cultural risks mostly unacknowledged–has magnified many of the shortcomings of present-day government oversight, laws and regulations in areas where science and technology meet public interest. At the heart of these shortcomings is the fact that the post-genome world lacks a transparent framework for risk and its regulation that includes the input of all knowledgeable stakeholders affected by these decisions, while simultaneously encouraging responsible technological and economic development.

The following interdisciplinary exploration begins with an argument for redefining risk for the post-genome world. Some of the potential scientific risks are being considered for the first time in history, such as the exposure of humans and the environment to genetic pollution from modified living organisms, and engineering of the human germline cells which pass along our heredity traits to future generations. Some of the social and economic risks may have equally far-reaching consequences: the theft of genetic resources, ongoing controversies over the patenting of genes and other living materials, the privacy and civil liberties risks of compiling DNA databanks, the economic risks of commodifying living organisms.

We continue with a discussion of the benefits and drawbacks to our reliance on the data and agendas of scientists, and an exploration of the risks posed by the ongoing oversimplification of this debate. We then present a series of perspectives from various disciplines on possible ways to mitigate these risks, closing with a discussion of some new and potentially useful approaches and methods for opening the process of governance to include the full complement of stakeholders who are affected by these historic and critical decisions made on their behalf.